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Introduction 
A common theme in memoirs, oral histories, and other sources dealing with servicemen 
in World War II seems to be a focus on the experience of combat. Training, particularly 
individual training, is rarely discussed beyond a cursory mention, and if it is discussed at all, the 
overwhelming tendency is to paint a picture of half-trained cannon fodder, at best. 
 This paper’s goal is twofold: First, explore methods of instruction at the individual and 
unit levels, and explain the reasoning behind the evolution of training as the Army Ground 
Forces’ understanding of contemporary warfare changed; second, provide a case study at the unit 
level by examining the combat record of the 28th Infantry Division as well as training 
experiences from retired soldiers in the infantry branch. 
 For the sake of brevity and clarity, infantry training in the United States Army will be 
scrutinized, on the grounds that infantry provided the bulk of combat arms within the United 
States military. However, the prosecution of combined arms warfare meant that infantrymen had 
to operate in conjunction with other combat arms such as artillery and armor. 
Thesis 
Although individual training standards actually increased for new inductees, these higher 
training standards did not correlate to better performance in combat at either the individual or 
unit level due to the loss of experience in collective training and combat.  
Historiography 
 Two digitized oral histories from Special Collections were used to show the typical 
induction experience for soldiers serving in the European Theater of Operations. Both Jay Gross, 
Jr. and Alan Tobie were inducted into Army service and saw combat as infantrymen in the ETO. 
These oral histories are not so much intended to identify what Army Ground Forces considered 
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typical experiences as they are intended to check against what Army Ground Forces considered 
“standard” individual training experiences.  
To enhance understanding of what this experience was like, period materials such as FM 
21-20 Basic Field Manual: Physical Training and WD PAM 21-9 Physical Conditioning will be 
used to show what was considered acceptable to the Army in terms of individual physical 
conditioning, in addition to Whitfield B. East’s postwar study A Historical Review and Analysis 
of Army Physical Readiness Training and Assessment.  
Additionally, pamphlets from Camp Kilmer and Camp Myles Standish will illustrate 
what the average experience in an embarkation camp was like, while “Shortage of Railroad 
Equipment for Transportation Purposes: Hearings Before a Subcommittee Pursuant to S. Res. 
185,” Roger D. Thorne’s “When German Prisoners of War Rode the Pennsy,” Chester 
Wardlow’s The Technical Services—The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, 
and Operation, and two railroad timetables from the wartime and immediate postwar periods 
will illustrate the complexity of organizing unit or individual movement within the United States. 
“Training of the American Soldier During World War One and World War Two” by 
Roger K. Spickelmier focused on the evolution of training from World War One, where the 
United States was able to mobilize, but not equip, a relatively smaller force that it eventually 
managed to surpass in World War Two, and therefore supplements the oral histories by filling in 
gaps in the training narrative. Where Spickelmier fell short was in his focus on individual, but 
not unit training. Additionally, while Spickelmier was able to show changes in terms of hours of 
instruction, he did not actually show how this instruction was delivered or how it was scheduled 
within basic training. In other words, one is able to know how much instruction in a certain 
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subject was being given, but without prior experience, one does not know how it fit into the 
overall basic training curriculum. 
 Conrad C. Crane, et al.’s Learning the Lessons of Lethality: The Army’s Cycle of Basic 
Combat Training, 1918-2019 built upon Spickelmier’s interrogation of how the infantry branch 
trained its troops by extending into the present day. Crane et al also showed a more specific 
breakdown of what phases of training actually entailed, and to a limited extent provided more 
insight as to where soldiers went for individual training. This included, for certain branches, 
combined basic and specialized training reminiscent of modern One Station Unit Training 
(OSUT) programs. However, Crane et al did not show what the actual syllabus was for 
individual training, nor did Crane et al discuss locations for infantry training or if they were 
structured similarly to branches with OSUT-style training. 
  The Army Ground Forces: The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops by 
William R. Keast and Robert R. Palmer will be used to show what the Army expected its 
notional collective, rather than individual training standard to be, based on studies conducted 
with nine infantry divisions (including one segregated or “Negro” division). Although Keast and 
Palmer’s work was exhaustive, it did not focus exclusively on the infantryman, because it 
focused on Army Ground Forces’ role as one of three equal components within the Army. 
Additionally, Keast and Palmer included other combat arms in their study. While useful in terms 
of lessons learned in a combined arms environment, it is beyond the scope of what this paper 
intends to accomplish. 
 Nathan Marzoli’s article “The Best Substitute: US Army Low-Mountain Training in the 
Blue Ridge and Allegheny Mountains, 1943-1944” discussed large-scale unit training programs 
in the United States impacting seven infantry divisions, including the targeted 28th Infantry 
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Division. Marzoli actually went into some detail regarding how unit training was structured and 
provided a reasonably detailed curriculum for specialized unit training at the battalion, regiment, 
and division level. This will be supplemented by Marshall A. Becker’s The Amphibious Training 
Center, dealing with amphibious training that the 1st, 4th, 28th, and 29th Infantry Divisions 
received in the United States before the landing forces of Operation Overlord were selected. 
 Weaver’s “The Volunteers of 1941: The Pennsylvania National Guard and Continuity in 
American Military Policy” and Holt’s “Operational Performance of the U.S. 28th Infantry 
Division, September to December 1944” both provide insight into the early and mid-war aspects 
of the 28th Infantry Division’s operational history. “Operational Performance” in particular, 
along with Thomas Bradbeer’s “General Cota and the Battle of Hürtgen Forest: A Failure of 
Battle Command?” present contradictory accounts of the 28th Infantry Division’s effectiveness in 
the field, but both examine the division’s abortive offensive in rough and heavily wooded terrain. 
 Antony Beevor’s Ardennes 1944: The Battle of the Bulge will be used to examine the 
performance of the 28th Infantry Division during the Ardennes Offensive, particularly the 112th 
Infantry Regiment’s performance in the defense of St. Vith, Belgium, as part of an ad hoc unit 
consisting of elements from four separate divisions. To a lesser extent, Ardennes 1944 will also 
be used to supplement Bradbeer’s “General Cota and the Battle of Hürtgen Forest” as well as 
Holt’s “Operational Performance”. 
Individual Training Theory 
 By 1940, the Army had recognized that it was not only necessary to establish, organize, 
and train new units on a wholesale basis, but that its system of training soldiers on an individual 
replacement basis needed a dramatic overhaul as well. Until this time, the Army’s protective 
mobilization plan had been predicated on the models implemented in the First World War, where 
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training standards were largely left up to unit commanders at either the battalion, regiment, or 
brigade level.1 Additionally, the individual soldier received the same type of training, regardless 
of what would eventually be termed his military occupational specialty (MOS).2 This was 
acceptable in the First World War and in the interwar period mostly due to the smaller overall 
size of the force; with a greater number of professional soldiers to inexperienced recruits, 
training could be completed to standard more often than not.3 
 Army leadership recognized that training would need to be somewhat centralized, though 
the vast numbers of both volunteers and conscripts would inundate the replacement system. To 
that end, leadership directed Army Ground Forces to establish a number of replacement training 
depots within the Zone of the Interior.4 Army Ground Forces partially drew on lessons learned 
from the First World War, where replacement training depots were also set up to fill out units 
affected by combat losses.  
While this system worked to raise the initial forces employed in the American 
Expeditionary Force (AEF), the system failed to provide for adequately trained replacements 
throughout the balance of 1918. Keast and Palmer described the First World War-era system as 
follows: 
In World War I the plan for producing replacements in the combat arms provided for 
training in depot brigades set up in each divisional cantonment…Training at the centers 
 
1 Conrad C. Crane, Michael E. Lynch, Jessica J. Sheets, Shane P. Reilly, “Learning the Lessons of Lethality: The 
Army’s Cycle of Basic Combat Training, 1918-2019,” (Army Heritage and Education Center), 1, 7-8, also Leonard 
L. Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System in the United States Army (Washington, D.C: Department of the 
Army, 1954) 242. 
2 Crane et al., “Learning the Lessons,” 1. During World War II, MOSes were further broken down into Service 
Specialization Numbers (SSNs). 
3 Ibid 4. This was purely theoretical; in practice, units during World War I could deploy without conducting any 
training whatsoever.  
4 Robert R. Palmer and William R. Keast, The Army Ground Forces: The Procurement and Training of Ground 
Combat Troops (Washington, D.C.: US Army Center of Military History, 1991) 169. Army Ground Forces has since 
been reorganized and redesignated as Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). 
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was thrown into constant confusion by emergency drafts, and the training was poorly 
conducted. The replacements they turned out received, on the average, less than a month 
of training…It finally became necessary, in order to meet the mounting casualties of 
divisions in the line, to strip the infantry privates from ten divisions which had arrived in 
France, thus breaking the divisions up or reducing them to skeletons.5 
 Even with these failures to provide adequately trained soldiers, there were elements of 
training that Army Ground Forces saw as beneficial or even necessary to emulate. Army Ground 
Forces found that replacement training centers for individual combat arms was useful because it 
allowed training to be segregated by combat arm, a practice that continues today.6 This was 
slightly modified from the First World War model by the addition of replacement training 
centers for the support services.7 What Army Ground Forces sought to do by adding replacement 
training centers for the support services was to prevent two things: First, prevent the 
occupational loss of infantry to the support services; second (and directly related to the first), 
prevent disruption of unit training by stripping combat troops from second-echelon units.8 In 
practice, neither goal was totally achieved—as one may see, certain units up to the divisional 
level were often shoehorned into the role of training units—but in general, Army Ground Forces 
was successful in creating a segregation between MOSes based upon combat arm or support 
service.  
 As always, this system could be misused, abused, or even ignored entirely. In some cases, 
this was due to a surplus of soldiers within a certain MOS, while a deficit in another MOS had to 
 
5 Palmer and Keast, The Army Ground Forces (1994), 169-170. 
6 Ibid 170. This process is now known as Advanced Individual Training (AIT) and follows Basic Combat Training 
(BCT). 
7 Ibid 170-171. 
8 Ibid 171. 
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be filled. In extreme cases, this was done at echelons up to the division level. In at least one 
instance, Lieutenant General Lesley McNair, commanding Army Ground Forces, complained at 
length to General of the Army George C. Marshall about the superficiality of some ad hoc 
reassignments; in one memo dated 1 January 1944, McNair wrote that “One division commander 
himself told me that when he needed replacements he went to the replacement depot and chose 
his men individually, regardless of arm or specialty, based primarily on their appearance and 
actions—somewhat as one would buy a horse.”9 
Additionally, there was jurisdictional friction over which command the replacement 
training depots would fall under. To give a sense of scale to Army Ground Forces’ debate over 
centralization of training, by the end of the war, the infantry branch alone operated thirteen 
separate replacement training centers, mostly clustered in the southeastern part of the continental 
United States.10 Some of these installations were shared with other combat arms or with the 
services of supply, such as Camp Roberts, California (shared with the field artillery branch), 
Camp Hood, Texas (shared with the armor branch), or Camp Robinson, Arkansas (shared with 
the Medical Corps).11 
Initially, all replacement centers fell under the command of the Services of Supply, 
including two directly reporting overseas replacement depots located in the east and west of the 
continental United States.12 After an unfavorable report regarding the Shenango overseas 
replacement depot in April 1943, and a series of inspections the following month, Army Ground 
 
9 Ibid 182-183. Neither the division nor the commander were named by McNair. 
10 Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System (1954), 267. See Figure 1 for list. 
11 Ibid 267. In general, the Army designates locations with permanently-stationed troops as “forts” while temporary 
facilities or locations with no permanently-stationed troops as “camps”. Camp Hood has since been redesignated as 
a fort. 
12 Palmer and Keast, The Army Ground Forces (1994), 179. These overseas replacement depots were located at 
Shenango, Pennsylvania and Pittsburg, California. 
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Forces established its own overseas replacement depots.13 This arrangement was accompanied by 
an extension of the infantry training curriculum from thirteen to fourteen weeks, then further 
extended to seventeen weeks for the balance of the war.14 
 The extension of training from thirteen to seventeen weeks was one of five plans put 
forward after Army Ground Forces briefly experimented with an eight-week course of common 
or “branch immaterial” training, followed by a period of schoolhouse instruction once the 
soldier’s MOS had been assigned.15 This was later reintroduced in August 1944 as a six-week 
branch immaterial course prior to MOS assignment, but this concept was again dropped in early 
1945.16 Although soldiers, regardless of branch, were expected to be proficient in some common 
tasks, slight curriculum differences between branches meant that progression of training was 
sometimes illogical. 
 In examining a breakdown of hours of instruction for training at the outset of the war 
versus training after the 1943 reforms, some lessons learned over the course of the war were 
apparent. A much greater emphasis was placed on individual skills rather than small-unit tactics, 
with some exceptions.17 Crane, Lynch, Sheets, and Reilly noted that individual soldier skills 
received approximately double the number of instructional hours in 1943 than in 1941, while 
similar trends were noted for what Crane et al called lethality training (effectively weapons 
training).18 The primary exceptions to these trends were in bayonet and grenade training, which 
decreased from 20 and 16 hours of instruction, respectively, in 1941, to 16 and 8 hours of 
 
13 Ibid 186-187. AGF overseas replacement depots were located at Fort Meade, Maryland and Fort Ord, California. 
14 Ibid 188. 
15 Ibid 396. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Crane et al., “Learning the Lessons,” 21. 
18 Ibid. This included familiarization with weapons other than the standard service rifle (usually the M1 Garand 
semiautomatic or 1903 Springfield bolt-action rifle). These weapons likely included individual weapons such as the 
M1 Thompson or M3 “Grease Gun” submachine guns, the M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle, along with crew-
served weapons such as the M1919 medium machine gun or M2 heavy machine gun. 
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instruction, respectively, after the 1943 reforms.19 Additional areas that received less emphasis 
were fieldcraft, hand-to-hand fighting (referred to in modern terminology as “combatives”), and 
basic military communication; in the latter two areas, soldiers had no formal instruction.20 
 Collective training at all levels was still given a relatively large amount of instruction. 
Like bayonet and grenade training, however, the amount of instruction given in collective 
training decreased after 1943.21 In this case, the decrease in emphasis on collective training was 
the result of Army Ground Forces’ wariness of training soldiers in units organized along similar 
lines to the ones that the trainees would be deployed to.22  
The rationale in this case was that Army Ground Forces wanted to produce generalized 
infantrymen rather than specialists in certain skills or weapons systems. Producing 
submachinegunners or automatic riflemen in quantity would have been counterproductive, 
according to this logic, because once mobilized, a line unit would only have so many of these 
infantrymen as per its table of organization and equipment (TO&E).23 It therefore followed that 
according to this logic, a training unit organized in a similar fashion could only produce so many 
of those specialists, regardless of whether or not losses among those specialists were above or 
below those replacement rates.24 Army Ground Forces came to the conclusion that it was simply 
more efficient to produce replacement riflemen who could qualify on other weapons than those 
issued in basic training, then learn the specializations based upon in-theater instruction. If the 
 
19 Ibid. A postwar study conducted by S.L.A. Marshall, then a brigadier general, supported the de-emphasizing of 
bayonet drills, including data from the ongoing Korean War. See also Ibid 33-34. 
20 Ibid 21. It is possible that combatives were included as part of physical training. This topic is discussed later. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Keast and Palmer, The Army Ground Forces (1994), 410. 
23 Ibid 407. This argument was put forward by Maj. Gen. Harry Hazlett, commander of Replacement and Schools 
Command. 
24 Ibid. 
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replacement was used solely in the capacity of a rifleman, then there was little risk in training for 
the wrong weapon. 
Training the Unit 
 Unit training was typically based on the division, since this was generally considered to 
be the smallest permanent unit that could be expected to deploy. This theory was also applied to 
activating new divisions, which would also include individual training for filler replacements. 
 Prior to June 1942, newly organized divisions were constituted from a cadre, or 
leadership element, of 172 officers and 1,190 enlisted men.25 This cadre was selected 
approximately two to three months before the division was officially activated, generally as a 
way to get divisional leadership to plan out the expected availability dates for phases of 
training.26 These availability dates were based on a 54-week cycle after the activation date, 
including an allotted 15 days for enlisted filler replacements to arrive at and be processed into the 
division and the eight week “branch immaterial” phase of individual training.27  
From June 1942 to early 1943, slight changes in organization were observed, though the 
training cycle itself did not change until later. General practice indicated a growth of 44 officers 
and 270 enlisted men, resulting in a cadre of 216 officers and 1,460 enlisted men, while an 
overstrength component of 15% was added in the case of losses (i.e. failure to complete training, 
accidents, selection for specialized schools or other training, et cetera).28 The final composition 
of a division in the organization process likely consisted of 248 officers and 1,679 enlisted men 
 
25 Bell I. Wiley, “The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions,” in Keast and Palmer, The Army Ground Forces 
(1994) 435-436. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid 438. 
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in cadre, with 452 officer and 13,425 enlisted filler replacements, totaling 15,804 officers and 
men.29 
 In late 1942 to early 1943, unit training was shortened from 44 weeks to 35 weeks.30 This 
was broken down as follows: 13 weeks (as per the pre-1943 infantry replacement training 
standards) of individual training, 11 weeks of unit training, and 11 weeks of combined-arms 
training.31 For the individual combat arm, the 11-week combined-arms phase of training was a 
prolonged validation period, proving that the combat arm in question, be it armor, artillery, or 
infantry, could work in concert with at least one of the other two arms.32 The unit and combined-
arms phases could be conducted at the division’s home station, but more often than not, they 
were conducted at five maneuver areas scattered throughout the United States.33 
 Based upon expected shipping dates for units, a divisional unit could be expected to go 
through at least one maneuver area during its period of stateside training. They tended to 
specialize in types of operational environments; for example, the West Virginia Maneuver Area 
was used for familiarization in mountaineering as well as warfare in woodland terrain, while the 
California-Arizona Maneuver Area specialized in hot-weather environments such as deserts.34 
In their most basic form, the maneuver areas consisted of empty or unused land 
surrounding a central installation. In some cases, airfields and associated gunnery or bombing 
ranges were also used for specialist training, as well as for flying units from the Army Air 
 
29 Ibid. Note that this figure without the overstrength allowance approximates the 28th Infantry Division’s authorized 
wartime strength of approximately 14,000 officers and men. See Jeffrey P. Holt, “Operational Performance of the 
U.S. 28th Infantry Division, September to December 1944,” (master’s thesis, United States Army Command and 
General Staff College, 1994), 36. 
30 Wiley, “Training Infantry Divisions,” in Keast and Palmer, The Army Ground Forces (1994), 444. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid 446-448. 
33“Shortage of Railroad Equipment for Transportation Purposes: Hearings Before a Subcommittee Pursuant to S. 
Res. 185,” (United States Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce, Washington D.C., 1943), 260. These were 
located in Oregon, California, Tennessee, Louisiana, and West Virginia. 
34 “Shortage of Railroad Equipment” (1943), 260. 
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Forces.35 The central installation was used for processing units and their equipment as they 
arrived at the maneuver area, as well as the training staff itself and ancillary personnel such as 
base mechanics, cooks, signals and communications specialists, and so forth.36 Depending upon 
the maneuver area’s environment or purpose, technical advisors or instructors would accompany 
the training staff, who served as umpires or referees for the force-on-force portion of the 
exercise, and range safety officers who supervised live-fire portions of the exercise.37 
Although safety was considered to be vital during the unit and combined-arms phases of 
training, injuries and fatalities were very real hazards. One incident in March 1944, in the West 
Virginia Maneuver Area, resulted in the loss of two enlisted men and one officer before any of 
them had set foot overseas.38 While attempting to cross the Blackwater River south of the town 
of Davis, a soldier from the 35th Infantry Division lost his footing and was swept away by the 
current. A nearby officer jumped in to try to rescue the soldier, but he too was swept away. A 
third soldier was also swept away downstream. All three drowned, but only one body was 
ultimately recovered.39 
Physical Readiness Training 
 In March 1941, a new field manual superseded prior literature regarding physical 
readiness training.40As more conscripts were inducted into the Army, it became apparent that 
“the average recruit does not possess the degree of physical fitness required of a trained 
 
35 “Site Layout: Northwest Maneuver Area,” [map], scale not given, US Army Corps of Engineers, n.d. By way of 
example, the Oregon, or Northwest Maneuver Area, comprised the central post of Camp Abbott, with the nearby 
Fort Rock Maneuver Area, Redmond Army Airfield, and two air-to-ground weapons ranges. 
36 Nathan A. Marzoli, "“The Best Substitute”: U.S. Army Low-Mountain Training in the Blue Ridge and Allegheny 
Mountains, 1943–1944," Army History, no. 113 (2019): 12. 
37 Marzoli, “The Best Substitute,” (2019) 12. 
38 Ibid 16. 
39 Ibid. 
40 “FM 21-20 Basic Field Manual: Physical Training” (Department of War, Washington, D.C., 1941), 1. 
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soldier.”41 To correct this, physical training was a vital aspect of both individual and unit 
training.42 
Physical readiness training, as the Army understood it, was not yet a fully standardized 
process as outlined in the present-day Army Combat Fitness Test,43 but the Army did want to 
establish a baseline statistic that it considered an acceptable minimum. It is important to note that 
the minimum standards for physical fitness testing were given as standards in field uniform, 
rather than in PT uniform.44 
To meet the minimum standards, as put forth in the 1941 version of FM 21-20 (i.e. the 
lowest of four categories that the Army published), a soldier had to be able to complete a 100 
yard dash in 14 seconds, a running high jump of 45 inches, a running broad jump of 12 feet, and 
20 push-ups, graded for form. Additional minimum standards included a half-mile run of 3 
minutes and 15 seconds, while a quarter mile was supposed to be completed in 87 seconds.45 
While these minimum standards were not particularly difficult for the average soldier to exceed 
once training was complete, it was not uncommon for otherwise qualified inductees to wash out 
of training or to be rejected outright from military service.46 
In 1941 and early 1942, Colonel Theodore Bank, at that time Chief of the Athletic and 
Recreation Branch, began to collaborate with Charles McCloy of the University of Iowa and 
 
41 “FM 21-20” (1941), 1. 
42 Ibid. 
43 The ACFT is in the process of superseding the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT). It is scheduled to replace the 
APTF no later than October 2020.  
44 Ibid 5-6. It is possible, if not likely, that a physical training uniform was not prescribed at all, though FM 21-20 
does show the soldier demonstrating calisthenics as wearing athletic clothing. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Whitfield B. East, A Historical Review and Analysis of Army Physical Readiness Training and Assessment, 
(Combat Studies Institute Press, US Army Combined Arms Center: Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2013), 82.  
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A.A. Esslinger of Stanford University in designing a standardized PRT testing model.47 In total, 
25 separate tests were administered to approximately 400 soldiers.48 Bank, McCloy, and 
Esslinger found that ten events correlated with determining overall fitness: Pullups, burpees, 
broad jumps, 75-yard piggyback runs, a dodging run, a six-second dash, situps, and a 300-yard 
run. The tests were then validated by a battalion of the 125th Infantry Regiment, stationed at 
Camp Page Mill, California.49  
The resulting test battery was the Army Ground Forces Test (AGFT), officially adopted 
in 1942, with nine total events: Pullups, burpees, squat jumps, pushups, a 70-yard piggyback run, 
situps, a 300-yard run, a 75-yard zig-zag run, and a 4-mile loaded road march.50 This test was 
revised yet again in 1944 by eliminating the zig-zag run and loaded road march events, and 
additionally lengthening the piggyback run event to 100 yards. The revised test, dubbed the 
Physical Efficiency Test Battery (PETB), was published in War Department Pamphlet (WD 
PAM) 21-9 in May 1944.51  
Unlike the 1941 version of FM 21-20, WD PAM 21-9 used a far more detailed, 
percentile-based system of scoring, with five scoring categories.52 Still, there were deficiencies 
in the adopted test. An “average” score could, in theory, net the tested soldier only 285 out of 
700 total points; percentiles for the “average” category could be as low as the 35th percentile.53 
 
47 East, Physical Readiness Training (2013), 89. COL Bank was known for playing quarterback at the University of 
Michigan under Fielding Yost, then coaching at Tulane University and the University of Idaho while serving in the 
Army Reserves. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid 89-90. Conveniently, Camp Page Mill had been constructed on land donated by Stanford University. See Don 
McDonald, Early Los Altos and Los Altos Hills (Arcadia Publishing: Mount Pleasant, SC, 2010), 95. 
50 East, Physical Readiness Training (2013), 90. Although administering the AGFT was optional, it was strongly 
recommended. 
51 “WD PAM 21-9: Physical Conditioning” (Department of War, Washington, D.C., 1944) 71. Testing events were 
presumably selected due to minimal equipment requirements. See Figure 2 for events and rough scoring standards. 
52 “WD PAM 21-9” (1944) 79. 
53 Ibid. 
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Additionally, a study conducted by the Army Ground Forces Medical Research Laboratory, 
conducted from September 1942 to March 1944 found that individual performance on the AGFT 
tended to be overpredicted, with most test subjects performing better than average.54 
Nonetheless, the AGFT and PETB represented a marked improvement in understanding 
how physical readiness and training correlated to the training cycle. Planners generally 
understood three phases of physical training, the first two phases of which more or less coincided 
with the originally envisioned thirteen-week training cycle.55 Training sessions were originally 
intended to take 1.5 hours per day, under FM 21-20.56 In practice, this requirement was not fully 
met by physical training sessions, but individual training could often cover for the balance of 
physical training requirements. 
Bank et al found that the first two phases of physical training were the toughening and 
slow improvement phases.57 This generally coincided with Bank, McCloy, and Esslinger’s 
experiences in coaching or other applications of sports medicine.58 The first phase, or the 
toughening phase, was characterized in WD PAM 21-9 by “a period of muscular stiffness and 
soreness”, which the individual soldier would recover from in the normal course of training.59 
During this phase, which would ordinarily last between one to two weeks, soldiers would focus 
more on precisely executing repetitions rather than executing them in quantity.60 
The slow improvement phase would take up the bulk of the training cycle, depending 
upon the age or starting fitness of the individual soldier.61 Contrary to its name, the slow 
 
54 Ibid 98. Conversely, Army Air Forces’ physical tests tended to underpredict physical fitness. 
55 Ibid 99. 
56 Ibid. 
57 East, Physical Readiness Training (2013), 99. 
58 Ibid. 
59 “WD PAM 21-9” (1944) 62. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
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improvement phase was characterized in WD PAM 21-9 by initially rapid improvement in 
fitness, usually characterized by increasing workload over time.62 At a certain point, however, 
improvement was usually observed to taper off until the soldier’s individual improvements were 
no longer appreciable, or alternatively had met or exceeded standards in the “excellent” score 
category of the PETB.63 
Once the slow improvement phase was complete, the individual soldier moved into the 
sustainment phase. Because WD PAM 21-9 was adopted after the extension of training from 
thirteen to seventeen weeks, the balance of individual training was conducted in the sustainment 
phase, with the major concern being the continuation of a high degree of physical activity during 
deployment.64 
Although rehabilitation for soldiers returning to duty was a possibility, WD PAM 21-9 
omitted sections regarding rehabilitation. It is therefore unclear as to which phase soldiers 
returning to active duty after wounds or injuries went into, or even if a unit was to be taken out 
of the battle line and sent for refit. 
Movement Overseas 
 Once a unit was given orders for movement overseas, it could travel hundreds of miles 
before even reaching a port of embarkation. Although American divisions possessed a far higher 
degree of mechanization when compared to divisions in other armies, divisions heading overseas 
typically avoided traveling by road for long distances. 
 Keeping in mind that road travel as a unit was an unlikely prospect, divisional units 
would coordinate travel with railroad companies along the intended route. A statement made by 
 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid. See also Figure 2. 
64 Ibid 62-63. A section of WD PAM 21-9 was dedicated to conducting PRT aboard transport ships and the like. 
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Lieutenant Colonel I.S. Morris before a Senate committee illustrated the complexity of a typical 
operation: 
We will say that through the normal course of events a movement is ordered today. We 
are told it is to leave Camp A on the 30th of December…and is to require 12 tourist 
sleeping cars. In the meantime, between now and December 30, many other movements 
will be organized. We set up a clearinghouse in our organization…they discover that on 
the 31st of December there is going to be a movement which comes into Camp A and will 
have, we will say, 14 tourist cars in it. If we let this movement go out on the 30th of 
December, it means that the railroads are going to have to direct some equipment in there 
to take those boys out on the 30th and on the 31st they are coming in with another 
movement, which requires deadheading passenger equipment.65 
 In many cases, Lt. Col Morris’ example was actually grossly simplified; interline travel 
was not discussed, although that was tangentially related to Morris’ area of expertise. That would 
mean that Morris and other transportation personnel had to coordinate movements on two or 
more railroads, most of which had limited experience with interline travel of whole trains. Those 
railroad companies that did have experience with interline travel of whole trains would often be 
hampered in their efforts by existing scheduling.  
For the duration of the war, this situation was aggravated by lack of new rolling stock, 
and when new rolling stock was available, it was often not available in appreciable quantities.66 
This situation was only slightly alleviated by government restrictions on the use of sleeping cars 
enacted by the Office of Defense Transportation at various stages throughout, and slightly after, 
 
65 “Shortage of Railroad Equipment” (1943) 258. 
66 Ibid 259, see also Roger D. Thorne, “When German Prisoners of War Rode the Pennsy,” Railroad History, no. 
205 (Fall/Winter 2011) 34. 
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the war, mostly between city pairs of short distances.67 In some cases, the situation was 
significantly aggravated by large numbers of prisoners of war, chiefly German or Italian, needing 
to be transported to inland prisoner-of-war camps.68 
 Despite these difficulties, the Army built temporary installations as staging areas for 
overseas movement along highly trafficked rail lines, both for individual and unit movement. 
These temporary installations were administratively used as subcamps for ports of embarkation, 
meaning that each staging camp could be called upon to handle multiple divisions at a time. 
Depending upon the size of the port of embarkation, there could be multiple staging camps 
subordinated to it. Ultimately, a port of embarkation could handle approximately 100,000 
personnel on one shipping day, though in practice shipping days could be weeks apart.69 
 As stated beforehand, because shipping dates could be infrequent and there was a strong 
impetus to keep soldiers physically fit, gymnasiums, football or baseball fields, and other athletic 
facilities were present in relatively large numbers in embarkation camps. For example, Camp 
Kilmer had four gymnasiums and one baseball field, or roughly one athletic facility per 7,500 
people (about half of one division).70 Camp Myles Standish had a multipurpose field and a 
recreation hall, roughly one athletic facility per 12,000 people (slightly less than one division).71 
 With the average dwell time at a typical embarkation camp being 7 to 11 days, the unit 
would then board another train.72 In most cases, this train would stop at or near piers or wharves, 
where the unit would then debark, then finally board a ship out of the Zone of the Interior. 
 
67 “Condensed System Timetables, Effective March 15, 1946” (Pennsylvania Railroad: Philadelphia, PA: 1946) 3. 
City pairs restricting the use of sleeping cars were generally less than 450 miles apart. 
68 Thorne, “German Prisoners of War” (Fall/Winter 2011) 34. 
69 Chester Wardlow, The Technical Services—The Transportation Corps: Responsibilities, Organization, and 
Operation, (Washington, D.C.: US Army Center of Military History, 1999) 112. 
70 “Information Map of Camp Kilmer, NJ,” [map], scale not given. 
71 “Welcome to the States: Boston Port of Embarkation, Camp Myles Standish, 1945,” Department of the Army, 
1945: 6-7. 
72 Wardlow, The Transportation Corps, (1999) 112. 
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The 28th Infantry Division’s Training Experience 
 Despite its use herein as a case study, the 28th Infantry Division had a somewhat unusual 
reputation throughout the course of the Second World War. Its prewar makeup, in a postwar 
analysis of enlistment data by Michael E. Weaver, indicated that half of all enlistees were high 
school graduates, roughly 4.5 times greater than the national average of eleven percent,73 while 
only three percent of new enlistees had less than an eighth-grade education, compared to the 
prewar Army’s average of 31 percent of soldiers with less than an eighth-grade education.74 92 
percent of the soldiers in Weaver’s sample were natives of Pennsylvania.75 The 28th Infantry 
Division’s attachment to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania ended, however, upon its 
federalization on February 17, 1941.76  
 The division was organized along the lines of a “square” infantry division, meaning that 
it was organized into four infantry regiments in two brigades each, with an artillery brigade of 
three regiments and an engineer regiment.77 This was a relatively large formation for its time, 
with a nominal strength of about 22,000 officers and men, but it was too large and unwieldly for 
mobile operations.78  
This structure was modified into the “triangular” division structure in January 1942, 
which compensated for the loss of an infantry regiment and the downsizing of the artillery 
 
73 Michael E. Weaver, "The Volunteers of 1941: The Pennsylvania National Guard and Continuity in American 
Military Policy," Pennsylvania History: A Journal of Mid-Atlantic Studies 72, no. 3 (2005): 355. While eighteen 
percent of Pennsylvania National Guardsmen had completed some post-secondary education, only seven percent had 
at least a bachelor’s degree. One quarter of all bachelor’s degree holders in the Pennsylvania National Guard were 
members of Troop A, 104th Cavalry Regiment, which had a reputation of being comprised of Philadelphia high 
society. 
74 Weaver, “Volunteers of 1941” (2005): 356. 
75 Ibid 358. 
76 Ibid 360. 
77 Holt, “Operational Performance” (1994): 14. 
78 Ibid. In practice, the 28th ID was almost 50% understrength. See Ibid 11. 
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brigade to one regiment by increasing the number of vehicles available.79 Additionally, with the 
increased number of vehicles available to the unit, the three individual regiments could operate 
more autonomously with attached artillery, engineer, or other units. This theory of operation, 
called the Regimental Combat Team (RCT), was also eventually adapted by the Marine Corps 
during operations in the Pacific Theater.80 
At this point, the division was in the thirteen-week individual training cycle discussed 
previously, meaning that it was receiving filler replacements directly from reception centers. 
Personnel exigencies also meant the transfer of more experienced officers and noncommissioned 
officers to provide cadre personnel for newly organized divisions.81 This created problems 
because every time a new group of men arrived, training was stopped and restarted. This 
significantly delayed the completion of individual training to the point where the division was 
conducting individual training during the unit and combined arms phases of training.82 
Under standards for new divisions prior to 1942, the division should have been ready, or 
nearly so, for deployment overseas. Because the division reorganized so late in its nominal 
training cycle, along with aggravating factors such as personnel transfer and poor performance in 
the 1941 Carolina Maneuvers, it was far from ready.83 In fact, these radical changes very likely 
reset the division’s availability cycle to the individual training phase. 
After reorganization and a more stable period of individual training in 1942, the division 
moved to conduct amphibious training at Camp Gordon Johnson, Florida, and Camp Pickett, 
 
79 Ibid 15. This also reduced the chain of command by one level, meaning that the divisional commander could take 
more control over the regiments. 
80 Ibid 16. The Marine Corps continues to use the RCT theory of operation, while the Army uses the similar Brigade 
Combat Team (BCT) concept. 
81 Ibid 14. Holt specifically notes that part of the 45th Infantry Division’s cadre was formed from 28th ID personnel. 
82 Ibid 16. 
83 Ibid. The constant training issues faced by the division resulted in the relief of Major General Garesch Ord by 
then-Maj. Gen. Omar Bradley. 
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Virginia in January 1943.84 For all units, not simply for the 28th ID, amphibious training was 
characterized by “haste and confusion”, particularly at Camp Gordon Johnson, which succeeded 
Camp Edwards, Massachusetts as the home of the Amphibious Training Center until the training 
center was disbanded in late 1943.85 A postwar study found that: 
At Camp Edwards and at Carrabelle [Camp Gordon Johnson] sufficient boats were never 
available to allow all personnel of the student units to practice in boats at the same time, 
so mock-ups were built on dry land and students were trained in them. These 
improvisations were built the same size as the real boats and served as valuable training 
aids in teaching methods of loading and debarking…Even moving boats and the rolling 
sea were improvised on dry land to teach firing of machine guns mounted in landing 
craft. The device used was a mock-up boat made of 2 x 4’s and burlap and mounted on a 
jeep. The jeep then traversed a rolling roadway, similar to the roller-coaster idea, which 
reproduced fairly accurately the motion of a boat in the water and afforded students 
manning the machine guns an opportunity to try their hand at firing on a simulated 
beachline from a simulated boat.86  
Training organization at the Amphibious Training Center was conducted by what training 
personnel called “groupments”, lettered from A to F. They were organized as follows: 
Groupment A “consisted of all officers assigned to G-2, G-3, and G-4, and the division 
automotive officer, engineer officer, ordnance officer, signal officer, surgeon, and 
quartermaster.”87 Groupments B, C, and D each consisted of an infantry RCT.88 Groupment E 
 
84 Ibid 18. Maj. Gen. Bradley had by this point been reassigned elsewhere. 
85 Marshall A. Becker, The Amphibious Training Center, (Army Ground Forces, 1946): 57. 
86 Becker, The Amphibious Training Center (1946): 45-48. 
87 Ibid 49. G-2, G-3, and G-4 refer to intelligence, operations, and logistics staff groups at the division level or 
higher, respectively. Corresponding staff groups at the regiment level or lower receive an S- prefix, e.g. S-2, S-3, 
and so forth. 
88 Ibid. 
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was made up of the division headquarters, the military police company, the headquarters battery 
for the divisional artillery regiment, reconnaissance troop, and other troops.89 By the time the 
Amphibious Training Center had relocated to Camp Gordon Johnson, Groupment F, which 
consisted of any attached commando or special operations troops, had been eliminated from the 
training organization.90 
Upon completing amphibious training at Camp Pickett and Camp Gordon Johnson, the 
division moved to the West Virginia Maneuver Area, where it would conduct low-mountain and 
woodland training operations for two months (August 1, 1943 to September 30 of that same 
year).91 Training there was usually broken up into weekly segments, with the first week of 
training given to instruction in mountain or night driving, packboard usage, and exercises at the 
squad, company, and platoon levels.92 The second week was broken up into two battalion and 
two RCT exercises, each lasting approximately one to two days.93 While descriptions of the 28th 
ID’s experiences in these exercises are not known to be extant, an experience typical of 
simulated combat came from the 77th Infantry Division’s 305th Infantry Regiment during the 77th 
ID’s rotation through the West Virginia Maneuver Area.94 
Under normal circumstances, an RCT would detach one battalion and certain supporting 
elements to act as a notional “Red Force”. The rest of the RCT would operate as the “Blue 
Force”.95 The 305th Infantry Regiment’s exercises took place at Jenningston, West Virginia, east 
of Elkins, and were described as follows: 
 
89 Ibid. 
90 Ibid 58. 
91 Marzoli, “The Best Substitute,” (2019) 12-13. 
92 Ibid 13. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid 13-14. The 77th ID was the only division trained at the West Virginia Maneuver Area to fight in the Pacific 
Theater. 
95 Ibid. 
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Late on (sic) the evening of 27 November 1943, commanders received information that 
the hypothetical “Red Division” was concentrating in the vicinity of Piedmont, 45 miles 
to the northeast, and had sent forces to the west. Red patrols had also been sighted nearby 
along the Dry Fork. The RCT was to attack at 0700 the following day. Their goal was to 
establish a bridgehead over Dry Fork, with the objective of moving north and east to 
seize a high ridge running from Pointy Knob #1, to Chimney Rock, to Pointy Knob #2, 
and destroying all enemy forces encountered along the way.96 
 The 305th Infantry Regiment’s regimental exercise was terminated on the 30th at 
approximately 1245, with the entire regiment reforming for a live-fire exercise beginning at 0830 
on December 2.97 After each exercise, the training staff would then debrief unit leadership as to 
what each unit did well and what each unit did poorly, such as failure to post security while in 
assembly areas, failure to dig in while in a defensive posture, or “skylining” by walking along 
exposed ridges.98 
 Once the training cycle at the West Virginia Maneuver Area was complete, the 28th ID 
boarded troop trains bound for Camp Myles Standish in Taunton, Massachusetts.99 It is not 
known how long this trip would have taken, but period timetables from the Western Maryland 
Railway and Pennsylvania Railroad give an approximation for a similar trip to Camp Kilmer, 
New Jersey as over 12 hours long.100 The division then boarded a troop ship for overseas 
movement, and on October 18, 1943, the 28th Infantry Division arrived in Britain, establishing its 
 
96 Ibid 14. 
97 Ibid. 
98 Ibid 15. This is not to say that the training staff themselves acted in a tactically-sound manner. See Ibid 16. 
99 Danny M. Johnson, “Camp Myles Standish, Massachusetts,” On Point, 13 no. 2 (Fall 2007): 27. 
100 “Condensed System Timetables” (1946) 37, “Passenger Time Tables, Schedule in Effect June 2, 1943” (Western 
Maryland Railway: Baltimore, 1943) 5. Camp Myles Standish would have been reached by further interchange with 
the New York, New Haven, and Hartford Railroad. 
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headquarters at Tenby, Wales.101 By April 15, 1944, the division headquarters had been relocated 
to Chiseldon.102 
 While stationed in Britain, the 28th Infantry Division continued to train for amphibious 
assault. Training there was concentrated at the Assault Training Center in Woolacombe, Devon, 
which had been chosen because its characteristics generally matched that of Omaha and Utah 
Beaches.103 Rupperthal described the exercise area as a 25 square mile area, including 8,000 
yards of beach on the Bristol Channel and another 4,000 yards of beach on the Taw estuary.104 A 
second training area, based in Slapton, was not used by the 28th Infantry Division for training, 
but it was eventually used for large-scale exercises as well.105 Training mimicked the training 
cycles at Camp Pickett and Camp Gordon Johnson, but also included provisional units known as 
Engineer Special Brigades.106 These would be attached to the divisions selected for the assault, 
then detached to handle over-the-shore logistics as well as operating temporary “Mulberry” 
harbors.107 
 In the event, the 28th Infantry Division was not actually selected for the landing on 
Omaha or Utah Beach, although the three American divisions that ultimately were selected had 
also trained at amphibious training centers within the United States, in addition to the Assault 
Training Centers at Woolacombe and Slapton.108 In theory, however, the 28th Infantry Division 
 
101 Order of Battle of the United States Army World War II European Theater of Operations, (Office of the Theater 
Historian: Paris, France) 1945: 115-116. 
102 Order of Battle (1945) 115-116. 
103 Roland G. Rupperthal, The European Theater of Operations: Logistical Support of the Armies, Volume I: May 
1941-September 1944, (Washington, D.C.: US Army Center of Military History, 1995): 341. 
104 Rupperthal, Logistical Support of the Armies (1995) 342. 
105 Ibid 345. Slapton Sands was later the site of Exercise Tiger, which was a large-scale rehearsal for the landings 
marred by German naval attacks and friendly fire incidents. 
106 Ibid 343. 
107 Ibid. The Mulberry harbor concept was essentially to create temporary harbors that could be used until port 
facilities could be captured and operated. 
108 Ibid 344. 
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was a very capable formation, particularly considering it had wasted a year of training prior to its 
reorganization, gone through extensive personnel turnover, and had three divisional commanders 
in just as many years. 
Bloody Buckets 
 The first elements of the 28th Infantry Division landed at Omaha Beach on July 22, 1944, 
approximately six weeks after the 1st and 29th Infantry Divisions secured the beachhead.109 The 
division was commanded by Major General Lloyd Brown, who had succeeded Maj. Gen. Omar 
Bradley when the latter was reassigned.110 The situation into which the division was placed was a 
relatively static, siege-like environment caused by the hedgerows prevalent in Normandy.111 To 
make matters worse, coordination between Army Ground Forces and Army Air Forces was 
mediocre at best.112 
 An unusually unfortunate example of poor communication happened on July 25, just 
three days into the 28th Infantry Division’s commitment to combat. First Army, to which the 
division had been assigned as part of its XIX Corps, was focusing efforts on breaking out via the 
town of St. Lo.113 On July 25, the plan was to advance following a preplanned airstrike on one of 
these roads.114 Lieut. Gen. Courtney Hodges, commander of First Army, described what actually 
happened: 
 
109 Thomas G. Bradbeer, "General Cota and the Battle of the Hürtgen Forest: A Failure of Battle Command?" Army 
History, no. 75 (2010): 22. 
110 Bradbeer, “A Failure of Battle Command?” (2010) 22. 
111 Holt, “Operational Performance” (1994): 21. The hedgerows or bocage restricted vehicular movement and 
visibility and provided units in the defense with excellent natural cover and concealment. 
112 William C. Sylvan and Francis G. Smith, "Operation Cobra and the Breakthrough at St. Lô, 25–31 July 1944," 
in Normandy to Victory: The War Diary of General Courtney H. Hodges and the First U.S. Army, ed. John T. 
Greenwood (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2008), 68-70. 
113 Sylvan and Smith, “Operation Cobra” in Normandy to Victory (2008): 65. 
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The sky was filled with the weary, earfilling drone of B-24s, and we looked through the 
torn corner of the house to the north. As far as the eye could reach they came—flying in 
twelves…The last notation I made in the count I was keeping for the General of those 
overhead was at 1010, when another large group of heavies went overhead. The next 
group, three or four minutes later, was the first to strike where unwanted. The warning 
was the same—the eerie whistle—but it was more urgent than the previous day’s, and we 
seemed to have more time to run. Most of the party reached the sunken road behind the 
house, or the ditch behind the road, when the bombs hit and tore the earth to shreds. 
Again, we found out later, they had smacked down the north-south road, and again to the 
right, and again on the two leading battalions of the 120th Inf (sic: Infantry Regiment). 
We got up…Against their advice, General McNair had insisted, for the second successive 
day, in staying on the very front lines…When the first cluster of bombs hit, the Major 
said that General McNair, to the very best of his knowledge, was occupying a foxhole 
just off the road, and some thirty yards from him…He led us a few yards up the road, 
twenty yards short of the crossroads at coordinate 446670, and there on the side of the 
road itself, indisputably tossed there by the explosion of the bomb, was the body of 
General McNair, recognizable by the shoulder patch and general’s stars.115 
 Including Lieut. Gen. McNair, approximately 100 men were killed and a further 500 
wounded by a premature weapons release.116 This also included the commanding officer of the 
120th Infantry Regiment, Col. Harry A. “Paddy” Flint.117 A few days later, a staff officer was 
declared missing.118 
 
115 Ibid 65-70. 
116 Ibid 71. 
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 The 28th Infantry Division was not immune to its own casualties, and losses among junior 
leaders, i.e. platoon or squad leaders, mounted especially rapidly.119 It was becoming obvious 
that Maj. Gen. Brown was being overwhelmed by the pace of combat, and on August 12, Brown 
was formally relieved of command, being replaced by Brigadier General James Wharton.120 
Wharton was killed in action that same day, however, and was replaced by Brig. Gen. Norman 
Cota.121  
 Following First Army’s breakout from Normandy, the 28th Infantry Division was 
reassigned to V Corps.122 Just two weeks into Cota’s tenure, the division was ordered to attack 
German positions in and near the eastern part of Paris.123 This attack was unusual in that the 
division’s movement to contact was held as a public parade.124 This decision was on one hand 
pragmatic, as it was the best way to get the division to regain contact with German forces, but on 
the other, it was a political decision caused by disagreements between Eisenhower and de 
Gaulle.125 In any event, the citizens of Paris watched as an American infantry division marched 
down the Champs Elysees. 
 The division continued to move east, covering 270 miles in a span of ten days.126 Starting 
on September 13, the 28th Infantry Division began its attack on the Siegfried Line.127 Shortages 
of ammunition, as well as lack of equipment such as satchel charges and Bangalore torpedoes, 
 
119 Holt, “Operational Performance” (1994): 21. 
120 Bradbeer, “A Failure of Battle Command?” (2010): 22 and Holt, “Operational Performance” (1994): 21. 
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actions on Omaha Beach.  
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meant that Cota could only commit two battalions, with the 112th Infantry Regiment temporarily 
detached to another division.128  
 The mounting casualties among infantrymen, particularly in junior leadership, coupled 
with shortages of critical equipment, meant that the division was quickly becoming ineffective in 
combat. Cota finally released the rest of the two regiments under his command on September 
14.129 The town of Üttfeld was nearly captured by elements of the 110th Infantry Regiment on 
September 17, but due to losses among the entire V Corps, Maj. Gen. Leonard Gerow ordered 
Cota to break contact with German forces near Üttfeld, consolidate his forces, and prepare to 
receive replacements.130 In five days of nearly continuous attacks, the 28th Infantry Division had 
taken over nineteen hundred casualties, as well as 830 non-battle injuries, mostly combat stress 
related. For the entire month of September, the division had suffered 230 killed in action, 1,815 
wounded in action, 141 missing, 63 captured, and 961 other injuries.131 Recognizing the 
division’s tenacity in combat as well as the number of casualties it had taken, German forces 
dubbed the 28th Infantry Division “der blutiger Eimer”. This nickname was adopted by the 
division in a tongue-in-cheek manner; men of the 28th Infantry Division soon referred to their 
division as the “Bloody Buckets.”132 
Replacements 
 By this point in the war, the training schedule for replacements had been modified into 
the seventeen week-long curriculum. As previously mentioned, the infantry had the greatest need 
of replacements, and operated thirteen Infantry Replacement Training Centers clustered in the 
 
128 Ibid. The 112th Infantry Regiment was detached to the 5th Armored Division. 
129 Holt, “Operational Performance” (1994): 28. 
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131 Ibid. 
132 Beevor, Ardennes 1944 (2015): 3-4 and Bradbeer, “A Failure of Battle Command?” (2010): 23. The 28th ID’s 
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southern United States.133 The replacements’ training, however, did not begin in these training 
centers. 
 A replacement, regardless of branch, would be inducted at a reception center.134 Often, 
this was a different location than the replacement’s training station. For example, Alan Tobie, 
then a student at the University of Connecticut, was inducted at Fort Devens, in Ayer, 
Massachusetts, then conducted basic training at Camp Croft in South Carolina, first as a 
communications specialist, then later as a rifleman.135  
Pre-induction physicals were primarily conducted by draft boards, mostly in county seats 
or in nearby cities. For exceptions to this rule, such as the experience of Jay Gross, Jr., the draft 
board’s location could be quite inconvenient; not counting travel time from Gross’ home in St. 
Marys, Pennsylvania to the nearest rail station in Emporium, a one-way trip to Erie, where the 
draft board physical was held, would take approximately five and a half hours.136 
A student eligible for the draft at Gettysburg College in 1943 or later could expect to be 
inducted into service at either Fort Meade, Maryland, or the New Cumberland Army Depot, 
Pennsylvania; the latter accounting for approximately 90 percent of all Pennsylvanians entering 
the Army.137 Most Gettysburg students, if drafted, tended to be inducted at Fort Meade.138 This 
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process was conditional upon passing a second physical examination; upon passing, the inductee 
would receive two weeks’ leave and be formally sworn in.139 
When the inductee arrived at either Fort Meade or New Cumberland after the two weeks’ 
leave, he would receive inoculations, be issued uniforms, and conduct an aptitude battery.140 This 
could take anywhere from four to forty days, with the mean being nine days.141 Once classified, 
the newly minted soldier would then be sent to a replacement training center based upon 
branch.142 
After the seventeen-week training period, the infantryman, along with soldiers from other 
branches or combat arms, would conduct overseas movement through one of the ports of 
embarkation. In theory, although the replacement infantryman was less experienced in terms of 
working in a small unit, he was better conditioned on an individual basis.  
Conversely, the lack of collective training meant that combat replacements were not only 
unaccustomed to their new units, but they also suffered, particularly without experienced 
leadership. This perfect storm of a lack of collective training and the heavy losses that the 28th 
Infantry Division suffered occurred just before a dramatic dip in the division’s performance. For 
many replacements, it would prove deadly. 
The Hürtgenwald 
 On October 27, 1944, the 28th Infantry Division relieved the 9th Infantry Division as part 
of a reshuffling of corps areas of responsibility.143 Over the past month, all three corps in First 
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Army had suffered significant casualties, but in general the First Army was arranged with XIX 
Corps in the north (the left flank), VII Corps in the center, and V Corps in the south (the right 
flank).144 The mission had been for the entire army to penetrate the Siegfried Line, but due to 
casualties, this had proven to be a difficult endeavor.145 
 The 9th Infantry Division had been assigned a mission to secure VII Corps’ right flank on 
September 29 by capturing the village of Schmidt.146 This had been deemed a key crossroads in 
the Hürtgen Forest, which itself was a potential stronghold for German forces.147 Another 
division, 3rd Armored Division, had also entered the Hürtgen two weeks before the 9th Infantry 
Division, but had diverted to the north after its attack had stalled.148 
 The 9th Infantry Division’s attack did not fare much better. By October 16, the 9th 
Infantry Division had suffered three casualties for every two yards it had advanced.149 After an 
advance of less than two miles, its attack had stalled as well, with a cost of 4,500 casualties.150 In 
addition to having to pull the 9th ID off of the line due to its unsustainable casualty rate, VII 
Corps had been assigned to a new offensive on the city of Cologne.151 V Corps was therefore 
assigned to the Hürtgen. Since the only division available was the 28th ID, it was given the 9th 
ID’s old objectives.152 
Unfortunately for the 28th ID, there were several key issues that would ultimately hinder 
the division in combat. First, the German army had been able to achieve force concentration 
 
144 Bradbeer, “A Failure of Battle Command?” (2010): 24. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. Lieut. Gen. Hodges’ decision to enter the Hürtgen Forest was possibly influenced by his service during the 
Meuse-Argonne campaign in World War I. 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid, see also Holt, “Operational Performance” (1994): 38. 
150 Ibid. 
151 Bradbeer, “A Failure of Battle Command?” (2010): 24. 
152 Ibid. 
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while in the defense.153 This meant that the German army’s natural advantage of being in the 
defense was amplified by shorter supply lines and effectively outnumbered a single division. In 
fact, between the 28th Infantry Division’s anticipated attack date on October 31 and VII Corps’ 
attack date of November 5, no other unit in Twelfth US Army Group would be on the offensive. 
This meant that the division was conducting a corps-level offensive by itself.154 
Second, because the division was conducting a corps-level offensive by itself, that meant 
that combat power would be drawn away from the division’s objective. In this case, this meant 
three separate attacks, each conducted by a reinforced RCT, rather than a division being 
committed against a single objective.155 Additionally, though this likely had little impact on the 
final execution of the attack, the three objectives had been selected at the corps level, with Cota’s 
only leeway being which RCT was assigned to each objective.156 
Finally, the rough terrain amplified a poor judgement call on Cota’s part. Cota declined to 
send out patrols to ascertain the German army’s strength, instead relying on intelligence gathered 
from the 9th Infantry Division and by V Corps.157 Further, this meant that Cota did not know if 
local roads could adequately serve as supply routes and would have to rely on combat engineers 
to improve these roads’ condition. 
The 28th Infantry Division ultimately was opposed by elements of four German divisions, 
all of which were relatively understrength but had an experienced cadre of officers and 
noncommissioned officers.158 V Corps intelligence had only identified two, 89. and 275. 
 
153 Ibid 25-26.  
154 Ibid 25. 
155 Ibid. While the division’s main objective was Schmidt, Cota had to divert two RCTs to cover his left and right 
flanks. 
156 Ibid. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Ibid 26 and Holt, “Operational Performance” (1994): 38. 
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Infanteriedivision, while 272. Volksgrenadierdivision and 116. Panzerdivision remained 
unidentified.159 
Although V Corps allocated a number of attached units to the 28th Infantry Division, Cota 
elected to use only some of these units. Notably, Cota only committed two companies from an 
attached armor battalion, while keeping the two attached tank destroyer battalions in reserve for 
the entire engagement.160 This was partially a consequence of the attack’s reliance on dirt roads 
and trails for supply routes, but on the other hand, the division had a habitual weakness when 
operating with attached tank or dank destroyer units.161 
The general lack of support from any form of armor meant that only two RCTs, the 109th 
and 112th, had anything approaching success early on in the battle. The 109th managed a partial 
success, capturing the village of Hürtgen but failing to secure the crossroads in the vicinity of the 
village, while one of its battalions had blundered into a minefield.162 By midday on November 1, 
the 112th RCT had captured Schmidt, but the RCT was strung out through three villages, without 
entrenching for the night.163 
The 110th RCT’s attack had gone extraordinarily poorly. With its 1st Battalion being held 
in divisional reserve, the rest of the RCT had its attack stalled almost directly at the line of 
departure.164 Unfortunately for the rest of the division, the 110th RCT’s bad luck was a harbinger 
for the whole division. 
 
159 Holt, “Operational Performance” (1994): 38. Volksgrenadier units prioritized defensive weapons and economy of 
manpower. 
160 Bradbeer, “A Failure of Battle Command?” (2010): 27. 
161 Holt, “Operational Performance” (1994): 20. By contrast, the 28th ID’s use of artillery was regarded as very good 
to excellent. 
162 Bradbeer, “A Failure of Battle Command?” (2010): 27-28. 
163 Ibid 28. 
164 Ibid. 
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On November 4, 3rd Battalion, 112th Infantry Regiment was routed and practically wiped 
out by elements of 116. Panzerdivision.165 The following day, 2nd Battalion of the same regiment 
was also routed after an intense artillery bombardment.166 On November 7, Lieut. Col. Peterson, 
regiment commander of the 112th, was wounded and Maj. Ford, commanding 1st Battalion, 109th 
Infantry Regiment, was killed.167 Offensive actions were cancelled, and what was left of the 
division was pulled back to rest areas in Luxembourg. The division and its attachments had 
suffered 6,184 casualties over the course of a week of fighting.168 The 112th Infantry Regiment 
had lost two thirds of its total strength while every company-grade officer in the 110th Infantry 
Regiment had been wounded or killed.169 One of the latter regiment’s battalions was reduced to 
fifty-seven men.170 
 In terms of the extended training given to infantrymen, three extra weeks of training were 
squandered by poor terrain, dogged enemy resistance, a dogmatic operations order, and 
questionable decision-making at the divisional and corps level. Some successes were apparent—
the 112th Infantry Regiment had taken Schmidt, an objective that had eluded the men of the 9th 
Infantry Division—but others, such as failing to dig in and establish defensive positions after an 
assault, were failures that outweighed them. Once again, the 28th ID would have to rebuild. 
Battle of the Bulge-Buying Time Before the Siege of Bastogne and Defense of St. Vith 
 On December 14, 1944, Col. B.A. Dickson, senior intelligence officer of the First Army, 
received a debrief of a German-speaking Belgian civilian, who reported troop concentrations in 
 
165 Ibid 30. 
166 Ibid 32-33. 
167 Ibid 35. 
168 Holt, “Operational Performance” (1994): 44. 
169 Bradbeer, “A Failure of Battle Command?” (2010): 36. Five of the division’s nine infantry battalions were 
commanded by majors or by captains. 
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the Eifel region, on the German/Belgian border.171 The debrief also described a greater 
concentration of bridging equipment than usual.172 To Dickson, this indicated that the Germans 
were about to execute an offensive. The report was dismissed as a hunch. 
 The 28th Infantry Division, meanwhile, had been reassigned to VII Corps under Maj. 
Gen. Joseph L. Collins. To their northeast was the green 106th Infantry Division, and to their 
south were the veteran 4th Infantry Division and 9th Armored Division.173 The 28th ID was 
arrayed with the 112th Infantry Regiment on the northern (left) flank, the 110th Infantry Regiment 
was in the center, and the 109th Infantry Regiment on the southern (right) flank. The division was 
situated along a hard-surfaced highway dubbed “Skyline Drive”, with the 110th defending the 
town of Clervaux in northern Luxembourg. 
 On December 16, the German attack caught the Allied armies off guard. The initial attack 
in the 28th ID’s sector was conducted by 116. Panzerdivision, along with other elements of the 
German 5. Panzerarmee, and by the following day the German attack had succeeded in breaking 
through the 106th ID’s lines and routing the latter division.174 That meant that the northern flank 
of the 28th ID, held by the 112th Infantry Regiment, had to be lengthened in order to cover what 
was left of the 106th ID.175  
In the center of the 28th ID’s line, the 110th Infantry Regiment was practically destroyed 
yet again along with a reinforcing tank battalion. By 0930 hours on December 17, Col. Hurley 
Fuller, commander of the 110th, reported that his command post in Clervaux had been overrun, 
 
171 Beevor, Ardennes 1944 (2015): 104. Beevor contended that Dickson’s warning was not taken seriously due to 
“an unfortunate knack of identifying German divisions in the west when their position had been confirmed on the 
eastern front”. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid 122. One of the members of the 106th ID was Kurt Vonnegut, later to gain fame as a novelist. See Ibid 186. 
174 Ibid 141. On the same day, elements of the 285th Field Artillery Observation Battalion were captured and 
executed by members of the Waffen-SS between Baugnez and Malmedy, Belgium. See Ibid 145. 
175 Ibid 152. 
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describing the situation by saying that a German tank was “sitting in his front door and firing 
in”.176 Additionally, the 110th was suffering from ammunition shortages.177 By December 18, the 
remaining elements of the 110th withdrew from Clervaux, with COL Fuller and the remaining 
company surrendering only after running out of ammunition.178 These survivors continued to 
fight delaying actions along the Clervaux-Bastogne highway, along with elements of the 9th 
Armored Division’s Combat Command R.179 The 110th’s delaying action would prove critical for 
the 101st Airborne Division to arrive in and secure the town of Bastogne. 
In the meantime, the 112th Infantry Regiment had joined with the 7th Armored Division, 
the 424th Infantry Regiment of the 106th ID, and Combat Command B of the 9th Armored 
Division in the defense of St. Vith. Over a 3-day period, this scratch team held the advance of the 
LXVI. Armeekorps to a standstill, albeit at an extremely heavy cost and the town of St. Vith no 
longer being a tenable defensive position.180 
Although the Allied forces, including the 28th ID, were forced to give ground at a high 
cost in men and in materiel, the 28th ID’s combat performance during the Battle of the Bulge 
dramatically increased vice the Battle of the Hürtgen Forest. In both battles, the impact of 
soldiers returning to active duty from wounds was negligible, meaning that the bulk of 
replacements in the division were completely inexperienced. Nonetheless, between the two 
campaigns, not enough time would have elapsed for there to be meaningful changes in the length 
or quality of replacement training. 
Analysis of the 28th Infantry Division’s Performance 
 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid. 
178 Ibid. 
179 Ibid. Combat commands were roughly analogous to RCTs in infantry divisions. Armored divisions had three 
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180 Ibid 225. 
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 By analyzing the 28th ID’s performance in combat through its participation in the Battle 
of the Bulge, one might visualize the division’s performance on a graph as having two distinct 
peaks and one distinct trough. The peaks generally coincided with the breakout from Normandy 
and the Falaise Pocket in late July and August 1944 as well as the division’s delaying actions in 
the Battle of the Bulge, while the trough coincided with the division’s participation in the Battle 
of the Hürtgen Forest. However, the division had finished its individual training phase before the 
lengthening of individual replacement training to seventeen weeks. 
 This would lead to the conclusion that individual training length was not a factor in the 
performance of large units. Rather, the performance of large units was predicated more upon 
collective training or integration, and in addition was heavily influenced by higher orders from 
divisional leadership, higher headquarters at the corps level, and the enemy’s own resistance. 
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Figure 1: Infantry Replacement Training Centers, Replacement and Schools Command181 
 
Replacement Center Date Beginning Operation 
Camp Croft, SC March 9, 1942 
Camp Roberts, CA “ “ “ 
Camp Wheeler, GA “ ” ” 
Camp Wolters, TX “ ” ” 
Fort McClellan, AL * January 1943 
Camp Robinson, AR * “ “ “ 
Camp Blanding, FL August 4, 1943 
Camp Fannin, TX ** September 1943 
Camp Hood, TX March 1944 
Camp Gordon, GA October 17, 1944 
Camp Maxey, TX “ “ “ 
Camp Howze, TX October 18, 1944 
Camp Livingston, LA November 13, 1944 
Camp Shelby, MS February 12, 1945 
 
* Converted from branch immaterial replacement centers 
** Formed from combined assets of replacement centers marked * 
 
Figure 2: Events and Standards for the Physical Efficiency Test Battery, Excellent Score 
Range182 
 
Event Repetitions or Time Raw Score Range 
Pullups 16-18 90-100 
Situps 70-82 88-100 
20 Seconds Burpees 12.75-13.75 88-100 
Pushups 39-44 88-100 
100 Yard Piggyback 0:20-0:18 88-100 
300 Yard Run 0:38-0:35 85-100 
Squat Jumps 61-72 86-100 
 
 
 
 
 
 
181 Lerwill, The Personnel Replacement System (1954), 267, see also Roger K. Spickelmier, “Training of the 
American Soldier During World War I and World War II,” (master’s thesis, United States Army Command and 
General Staff College, 1987), 93. Croft, Roberts, Wheeler, and Wolters were extant infantry replacement training 
centers at the outset of the conflict. 
182 “WD PAM 21-9” (1944): 79. Situps and pushups were to be completed consecutively; test candidates could not 
rest in the upright position. 
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Figure 3: Comparative Events and Standards for the Army Combat Fitness Test, Heavy 
Physical Requirements183 
 
Event Repetitions, Weight, 
Distance, or Time 
Raw Score Range 
3 Repetition Maximum 
Deadlift 
200-340 lbs 70-100 
Standing Power Throw 8-12.5 meters “ “ 
Hand-release Pushups 30-60 “ “ 
Sprint-Drag-Carry Shuttle 
Run 
2:10-1:33 “ “ 
Leg Tucks 5-20 “ “ 
2 Mile Run 18:00-13:30 “ “ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
183 “Army Combat Fitness Test Initial Operational Capability: 1 October 2019 to 30 September 2020” (Center for 
Initial Military Training: Fort Eustis, VA, 2019) 12. The pushup event was modified in the ACFT to include the 
hand release. Leg tucks replaced the situp event and must be completed consecutively. 
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Figure 4: 28th Infantry Division during the Liberation of Paris184 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
184 American Troops of the 28th Infantry Division March Down the Champs Elysees, Paris, in the "Victory" Parade, 
August 29, 1944. Paris, France. 
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Figure 5: Shoulder Sleeve Insignia, 28th Infantry Division185 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
185 US Army Institute of Heraldry, 28th Infantry Division Shoulder Sleeve Insignia, 2 3/8” X 2 3/8”. 
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